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Vol. XXXIV, No. 877

April 16, 1956



THE MESSAGE OF AMERICA • Remarks by President Eisenhower 633

**SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW SOVIET LINE CONCERN-
ING STALIN ERA • News Conference Statement by
Secretary Dulles 637**

**THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION • by Deputy Under
Secretary Murphy 644**

**SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES UNANIMOUSLY ON
U.S. PROPOSAL TO SEND SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL HAMMARSKJOLD TO MIDDLE EAST •
Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Text
of Resolution 627**

For index see inside back cover



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Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East

Following is the text of a letter of March 20 from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council, Sir Pierson Dixon, requesting a meeting of the Council to consider the Palestine question, together with a series of statements by Ambassador Lodge during the Security Council debate. On April 4 the Council adopted unanimously a U.S.-sponsored resolution on this agenda item (see box).

LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

U.S./U.N. press release 2372 dated March 20

I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider the following agenda item:

The Palestine Question: Status of Compliance Given to the General Armistice Agreements and the Resolutions of the Security Council adopted During the Past Year.

The Government of the United States has become increasingly concerned over recent developments in the Palestine area which may well endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Information relating to the build-up of armed forces on either side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines leads the United States to believe that the parties may not be fully complying with the provisions of their Armistice Agreements which stipulate limitations upon armed forces in or near the Demilitarized Zones and the Demarcation Lines.

The instances of firing across and otherwise violating the Demarcation Lines are recurring at a dangerous rate. Despite the earnest efforts of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization the parties have not agreed to proposals

which he has put forward to them on his own initiative or as a result of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955,¹ 8 September 1955,² and 19 January 1956.³ These three resolutions had the unanimous support of the Security Council and it should therefore be a matter of genuine concern to each of its Members to ascertain the extent of compliance being given to them. It is a matter of deep concern to the Government of the United States and it, therefore, requests urgent and early action by the Security Council to consider the situation now prevailing in the Palestine area.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 26

U.S./U.N. press release 2376 dated March 26

The United Nations has been dealing with the Palestine question almost continuously since April 2, 1947.

Since August 11, 1949, when the last of the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States had been signed and all had been approved, the Security Council has met on the Palestine question 90 different times. No other question has so occupied the attention of the Council. No other question has so persistently challenged United Nations efforts.

Today, the 26th of March, 1956, 7 years since the armistice agreements were signed, the Palestine question is still unsolved. In fact, during recent months the situation has deteriorated and the world is alarmed at the prospects which it sees in the Near East.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 662.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

Resolution on Palestine Question¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956,

Recalling that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned were requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice lines should be reduced,

Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not been carried out,

1. *Considers* that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points:

(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the Armistice Demarcation Lines;

(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines and in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas;

(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements;

4. *Calls upon* the parties to the General Armistice Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council in his discretion but not later than one month from this date on the implementation given to this resolution in order to assist the Council in considering what further action may be required.

¹ U.N. doc. S/3575; adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Apr. 4.

This need not have been the case. In the opinion of the United States progress had, until recently, been made, and we thought that most of the basic issues underlying the uneasy truce in Palestine were coming nearer to a solution. United Nations efforts in the General Assembly,

in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, in the Security Council, and in the Truce Supervision Organization were producing hopeful signs of progress, and the trend was toward peace. That trend, unfortunately, has recently been reversed.

It would be wrong to conclude that the United Nations has failed in its responsibilities. War has not come again to the Holy Land, and we trust that it never will. The indispensable factor in preventing hostilities thus far has been the United Nations. The present alarming situation challenges this organization again to find new means of arresting the present grave trend. This organization cannot fail to accept that challenge—which has certainly never been more serious than it is at this moment.

The United States, having taken fully into account all of the circumstances of the present situation, is convinced that through this organization the present tensions must be eliminated and the prospect for peace restored. We have not sought to come before the Council at this time with any indictment or bill of particulars, or any detailed assessment of the blames and shortcomings of one or the other of the participants in or outside of the area of conflict. We have felt instead that the situation is much too serious for us to lose any time in setting into motion the full authority of the United Nations to deal with the present ominous drift.

We propose, therefore, that the Council request the Secretary-General to undertake immediately a personal investigation of ways and means of settling the numerous problems which stand in the way of peace.

In these circumstances it is clear that the United Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. The United States believes that in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956. Each of these resolutions had the unanimous support of the members of this Council. They represent the combined judgment of the members as to the essential steps to be taken to reduce the tensions. There is no question in our mind that, if these steps had been carried out, we would not now have the serious situation which confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that they should be carried out.

We therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council⁴ that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect.

We feel that these measures can and must be given special consideration. The Chief of Staff has repeatedly emphasized the primary importance of several of these measures. We feel that they deserve an honest chance. General Burns' efforts must therefore have our continued and full backing, and the proposal that we have placed before this Council would give him exactly that.

The draft resolution proposed by the United States is not intended in any way to derogate from the overall responsibility of the Security Council in this question. We would expect the Council to continue to follow with the greatest concern the developments in the area and to hold itself in readiness to deal at any time with any problem which might arise.

We have therefore proposed in the draft resolution that the Secretary-General should report to the Security Council not later than one month from the date of the adoption of the resolution, at which time the Council would consider what further steps might be necessary or desirable for it to take.

Mr. President, the United States believes that each member of the Council will recognize the need for the kind of action which we have proposed. We trust that each member of the Council and the parties will recognize the good faith with which this proposal is brought forward and will lend to the Secretary-General their full support. Clearly this is in the mutual interest of us all. Anything less can only lead to our mutual detriment.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 28

U.S./U.N. press release 2381 dated March 28

Let me first thank the representatives of Cuba, of Belgium, and of China for yielding to me for these few moments so that I may make this statement. I appreciate their courtesy.

Mr. President, when we adjourned on Monday,

⁴ U.N. doc. S/3562 dated Mar. 21.

it was the Council's understanding that after today's meeting we would meet again on Tuesday, April 3. I trust that on April 3 we will come to a vote after having heard further statements by the members of the Council or such statements as the parties care to make. That is my understanding of the sense of the meeting last Monday.

In view of certain remarks which have been made to me since then, it may be helpful if I now make a few words of explanation.

Frankly, the United States draft seemed to us to be so simple and clear that there could be no misunderstanding as to our intention. Indeed, it has come as something of a surprise that anyone could find in it any hidden meaning. That would be a baseless suspicion indeed.

Our draft resolution speaks for itself. Its meaning is right on the surface. The course which we advocate is a normal procedure. It is what we would expect to have done in our case if we were in a similar situation. I do not believe I can put it any more plainly than that.

Note also, please, gentlemen, that each member of the Council has supported the resolutions on which the United States draft is based. In other words they have been unanimously endorsed. That is a significant fact. And note also that the parties to the Palestine question have themselves in recent months expressed growing concern at what they feared to be developments on the part of the other side inimical to themselves.

Now, feeling as we did that this concern was shared by all, we believed there would be—and that there should be—prompt approval of our initiative to bring about discussions between the Secretary-General and the parties to find agreed measures for reducing the tensions and carrying out the armistice agreements.

Now, let me repeat, there are no hidden meanings in this, and if you search from now until doomsday with a magnifying glass the only purpose you will find is to prevent war. That, after all—I need hardly say it in this room—is the first purpose of the United Nations.

As I said on Monday, we do not propose to review the issues in the Palestine question, and we do not feel that others would wish to do so in view of the urgent need for action. This, too, is reflected in the very limited nature of our text.

We wanted two things: to act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in act-

ing promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

We had hoped that at the end of today's meeting the Security Council would have approved the mission by the Secretary-General which we propose, and that he could pack his bags and leave right away. But we did not wish to give ground for anyone to say that he had been rushed—even though the proposal is so simple that the more than 8 days which have elapsed since it was given to the Council members and to the parties seems more than enough.

Mr. President, we hope that the Security Council will act speedily and that our resolution will be approved by the Council and the parties. It is in all truth a good-faith effort for peace.

FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 3

U.S./U.N. press release 2384 dated April 3

I am confident that there is no basic misunderstanding, either by the parties to the armistice agreement or by the members of the Security Council, as to the intention of the United States in bringing the pending draft resolution before the Council.

But certain questions have been asked which I am glad to answer and which may, I believe, be summarized as follows:

a) Are the measures which the Secretary-General might recommend for discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff to be within the framework of the General Armistice Agreements?

b) Is the proposal contained in paragraph 3 (a) of the draft resolution to be considered applicable in general, or where appropriate and in accordance with local conditions?

c) Are the demilitarized zones and defensive areas referred to in paragraph 3 (b) those zones and areas as defined in the armistice agreements?

d) Do the various aspects of compliance with

the General Armistice Agreements which the Secretary-General is requested to survey refer to matters outside the General Armistice Agreements or only to those matters with which the Truce Supervision Organization is expected to deal?

e) Is it intended that the Secretary-General should undertake to amend the armistice agreements?

f) Are the arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 (c) arrangements in the nature of agreements by the parties or in the nature of added forces and machinery?

g) Does the request to the Secretary-General to report in his discretion refer to the timing or to the nature of the report?

These questions can first be answered by recalling my original statement to the Council on Monday, March 26th. In describing the objectives of the United States I stated that, in the present circumstances, it is clear that the United Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. I went on to say, therefore, that "the United States believes that in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956." I pointed out, moreover, that "each of these resolutions had the unanimous support of the members of this Council. They represent the combined judgment of the members as to the essential steps to be taken to reduce the tensions." I said further that "there is no question in our mind that, if these steps had been carried out, we would not now have the serious situation which confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that they should be carried out." I said in this same connection that "we therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect. We feel that these measures can and must be given special consideration."

These quotations from my statement introducing the draft resolution are the core of the United States position, but, to make that position unmistakably clear, I spoke again at our last meeting

to emphasize our concern and to place our proposal in its proper perspective. Thus, at the meeting of Wednesday, the 28th of March, I again summarized our position as follows: "We wanted two things: to act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in acting promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result."

I believe that it is fair to say that this adequately summarizes the United States position. In reviewing the questions which have been placed before the Council by the parties, it seems to us each of these questions is answered by the statements I have referred to.

The representative of the United Kingdom put the case even more simply when he said "first things must come first." In speaking of those matters which must receive immediate attention, Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say that these were problems in which "if one cannot move forward, one finds one's self slipping back."

It has been this backward trend which the United States wished to halt. We see no other way of preventing such a backward trend at this moment than by providing for strict compliance with the armistice agreements between the parties and the resolutions of the Security Council to which I have referred.

What we are dealing with now are the immediate problems standing in the way of peace and which concern the compliance of the parties with the General Armistice Agreements and the carrying out of measures which the Security Council has already endorsed, in its recent resolutions, for insuring compliance with those agreements.

I repeat that this is the immediate problem, and this is the immediate purpose of the United States initiative.

Now to be even more specific: the draft resolution envisages that the Secretary-General should arrange, after discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff, for measures entirely within the

framework of the General Armistice Agreements and the resolutions under reference.

Such measures would, of course, be applicable where, by agreement between the Secretary-General and the parties, they consider conditions warrant.

The references in the draft resolution to the demilitarized zones and defensive areas are naturally those defined in the armistice agreements.

The various aspects of compliance with the armistice agreements which the Secretary-General is requested to survey refer only to matters which would come within the natural purview of the armistice machinery and the Truce Supervision Organization.

The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 (c) would, of course, be arrangements as agreed between the parties and the Secretary-General.

It would not be a service to the Secretary-General or to the parties directly concerned to enumerate further the problems or the measures with which together they might wish to deal or those with which he should not deal. We feel that, with the clear understanding that the mission of the Secretary-General is governed by the Security Council's resolutions and the armistice agreements, such a spelling out is not necessary nor indeed desirable. The kind of undertaking which we are asking the Secretary-General to undertake becomes quite clear when seen in this context.

I hope that these explanations will be received by the parties in the same spirit of cooperation as they are given. It lies with the parties in the end to determine the success or the failure of the Secretary-General's mission. It will be for them to determine in the final analysis the steps to be taken.

The Secretary-General naturally cannot amend or set aside the undertakings of the parties in the General Armistice Agreements. As members of the United Nations and as sovereign nations the parties share with the members of the Security Council the responsibility for determining what can best be accomplished.

The Security Council is, of course, not relinquishing its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in adopting the draft resolution proposed by the United States.

The resolution requests the Secretary-General to report not later than one month from the date of its adoption. He may report sooner if he considers

it desirable. This is what the phrase "in his discretion" refers to.

In the light of the Secretary-General's report and of the situation then prevailing, the Council would have to consider whether any further action was required and what that action might be. The United States would not presume to say what the Council should do a month from now. We can and do hope that further action concerning compliance with the armistice agreements and the carrying out of these resolutions will not be necessary.

This attempts to be a completely categorical and responsive reply to the questions which have been raised by representatives of the parties to the armistice agreement.

SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 3

U.S./U.N. press release 2385 dated April 3

In accordance with the custom whereby the sponsor of a proposition is expected to express himself on amendments, and as a matter of fact in response to at least one request which has been made, I make this statement on the subject of the amendments which have been introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The amendments to the draft resolution which have been put forward by the Soviet Union are not only in the opinion of the United States not in any way necessary; they also do not seem particularly desirable. Without making a detailed analysis now, it is perhaps enough to say that these amendments are not improvements. This is, I think, an understatement.

Amendment No. 1 goes back into the past without accomplishing anything constructive thereby.

Amendment No. 2 is fallacious because it is clear that failure to comply with three unanimous resolutions of the Security Council is in the words of the resolution "likely" to endanger peace. Now surely it is not exaggerated to say that noncompliance with three unanimous resolutions is "likely" to endanger peace. It seems none too strong.

Amendment No. 3 seems to us to put the cart before the horse. Obviously there must be discussion before there is concordance. To say that concordance must precede discussion seems to us to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3 as drafted clearly means that agreement of the parties will

be necessary for the adoption of measures for reducing tensions.

The words "in the defensive areas" as now included in the draft resolution make quite clear that the defensive areas are those areas provided for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet representative's amendment in this respect is unnecessary, I submit, and I understood the Soviet representative to say he would not insist upon it.

The objectives of the pending proposal have, I think, been made clear beyond any shadow of a doubt. The draft resolution is addressed to a clear and present danger. Our sole intent is to dispatch the Secretary-General to the area so as to reduce the growing tension. We believe that the present text of the draft resolution is sufficient in its present form, and, as every member here knows, it was very carefully written.

We also believe that the governments in the area are prepared to accept the resolution as it is, and we think that the debate that has taken place here today and in preceding days has made that clear.

As the sponsor of the draft resolution, therefore, we believe it is desirable not to accept amendments.⁵

FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 4

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

There of course is nothing wrong with the Government of the United States communicating with 3 countries or 30 countries in an effort to keep the peace—and I note that the Soviet representative did not say there was anything wrong with it. This proposal we have here today is not a 3-nation proposition. We hope it will soon become an 11-nation proposition.

Gentlemen, in view of the fact that yesterday I gave my arguments against the Soviet amendments, and in view of the fact that the objections to these amendments have been very eloquently explained by the representatives of Peru, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, I will not take any more time of the Council to argue against them further.

I perhaps might say that the capitalizing of the phrase "Defensive Areas" is not an amendment. It is a typographical rectification. The position

⁵ The amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. (U.N. doc. S/574 dated Apr. 3) were rejected on Apr. 4.

of the United States is still in opposition to amendments.

SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 4

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

Before we adjourn this meeting, perhaps the members of the Security Council will forgive me if I express my appreciation to the members and to the representatives of the parties for the tone which they have all observed here; for the high level and the high plane on which this vitally important and delicate matter has been discussed.

To be President of this Security Council is one of the great honors that can come to a man, but for me, in this particular case, it is something more than an honor.⁶ It has been a very precious experience indeed to have the cooperation of all of the distinguished men who are seated around this table. I shall always remember it and wish to express my thanks to you for it.

Let me finally say to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and I feel sure I speak for everyone present when I do so, that as you leave on this mission you carry with you not only good wishes and our hopes, but our heartfelt confidence and high regard and great expectations for your success.

Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 175) that Alberto Martin Artajo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Señora de Martin Artajo would be accompanied by the following party during their visit to the United States from April 9 to April 18:

José M. de Arelliza, Count of Motrico, Ambassador of Spain to the United States
Countess of Motrico
General Francisco Fernandez-Longoria Gonzales, Chief of Staff, Spanish Air Force
Señora de Fernandez-Longoria
Juan de las Barcnas, Director General of Foreign Policy
Señora de las Barcnas
Juan José Rovira Sanchez-Herrero, Director General of Economic Cooperation
Aurelio Valls, Press Section, Foreign Ministry

⁶ Mr. Lodge became President of the Security Council for the month of April.

The Message of America

*Remarks by President Eisenhower*¹

I think it was last year, gentlemen, when I met with the Advertising Council,² that I made the request that the Council would try to do something about extending their good work to helping the Government solve some of its problems in the foreign field.

Not only has the record of the past year shown that they took me seriously, but I am particularly delighted that this year they brought some of their bosses along with them so that they can get educated also, because we are talking about one of the most pressing problems with which the Government—indeed with which the whole Nation—is confronted constantly. There is nothing that takes place at home of any great importance—if it is a difficult problem, at least—that is not caused by or at least is colored by some foreign consideration.

During this past year the Advertising Council got together a team of experts and went over the whole series of factors involved in these problems and came up with some very fine suggestions. The one I want to mention particularly—a product of their imagination—was the exhibit of “People’s Capitalism.” I don’t know how many of you have seen it, but to me it is the kind of message that America ought to be carrying abroad. I would have liked to have seen some kind of adjective put between “people’s” and “capitalism”—something of the order of—if not “democratic,” something of the order of “competitive” or something of that kind. But in any event, the exhibit itself shows what the system of capitalism will do for a people. What it has done in this country in a very, very short time, measured by historical units, is a very telling thing.

I actually could hope that the truth that it exemplifies and shows could be brought home to our own people as well as to those abroad for whom it was designed. Because I think too often we forget some of the features of our own system that have been so responsible for the place this Nation has reached. So before I leave that part of what I

¹ Made before the 12th annual Washington Conference of the Advertising Council on Apr. 3 (White House press release).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 609.

wanted to say to you, my thanks to the agencies for the time and talent they have contributed and are continuing to contribute through the media—enlisting the space on radio and television—and for the good work of all, particularly to the businessmen supporters of what the Council has been doing, with the Government as its principal beneficiary.

Now, when we consider this system of which we are so proud, we recognize that, like all things human, it is neither perfect nor does it sustain itself forever without the people who are living in it and are part of it doing something about it. Internally and externally any form of government, and particularly self-government, is always subject to some kind of attack, particularly successful government that has brought material prosperity in the measure which ours has. Internally we watch that government, we watch it very carefully. We watch particularly the Federal Government to see that it doesn't transgress into fields from which it should abstain, except only in those cases where the changing miracle of industrial life brings about problems that are not solvable by communities, by private enterprise, or by individuals.

There we try to stick to the old Lincolnian dictum that it is the function of government to do for people those things they could not do for themselves and to stay out of things in places where the people can do things for themselves. We would hope, therefore, to have wisdom in government to help distinguish this line beyond which government should not go and yet be courageous in doing those things that it should do.

Likewise, we should hope always for more wisdom in business leadership, not only in the business man and in business management but in their concert with labor, so that in the individual company or the corporation—particularly the influential ones—we do not make decisions that damage us and the kind of system that we are trying to run. That can easily be done within the corporation just as well as it can within the Congress or within some regulatory commission.

Using Our Influence Abroad

Now, let us turn our eyes abroad. There is an old story about the man in a town who owned the factory on which the living of the community depended. He built a great house on the hill, and all the rest of the people lived in the plain below in fairly meager circumstances. The climax of

the story was, when things began to go bad, that the man on top found that he was not safe except only as the people below were contented and believed that they were advancing. When they became depressed and lost their morale, and the company began to fail, this man fell further than the others because he had a greater distance to go.

Within a certain degree, that story has applicability in the world today. The United States cannot live alone—a paragon of prosperity—with all the rest of the world sinking lower and lower in its standards of living.

There are many ways in which we can use our influence to make certain that other peoples recognize the virtues of a free, competitive capitalistic system rather than take the shortcut—the spurious and false road that is offered them by the communistic ideology.

You see, in many of these less developed areas of the world, there is a very great ambition to industrialize themselves. Now the Communist comes along and says: well, you see what we were 40 years ago? Look what communism has done for us. And today we can bring to you this steel mill or help you with this dam, or do this or that.

There is a very great appeal, because of the very rapid transformation that on the surface, at least, and under forms of dictatorship has been accomplished in Russia. The man who is listening to the story doesn't understand that underneath this great facade of industrial organization there is slavery, human misery, rather than human happiness—no opportunity for a man to realize his own spiritual, moral, physical, and economic aspirations through his own efforts. He obeys. He is regimented. But they don't say that. As a matter of fact, it is not of importance at the moment, because it is only in such a society as ours, based upon the dignity of man, that the importance of that kind of thing to humans is recognized and catered to.

And so we must carry not only a material message to the world of what the kind of enterprise we have—the kind of system—can do for a people. We must carry those moral values, spiritual values of the worth of man—what he is entitled to as an individual. We must say not merely what this or that state would do if they would follow that line, because I think it is not to be denied, if you would give the communistic system to any backward country, with a complete dictator who could direct everything without question, he could make,

on the short run, more rapid progress than could we by the cooperative method that is inherent in democracy.

So I think that we must realize that, unless we do these things in the world, someone else will do them through false doctrines. And we finally will reach more and more that place where we are isolated from the rest of the world, with the whole world in a position possibly of envy and then of hatred, open antagonisms, that will reflect itself in first, let us say, refusal to trade, then breaking off relations, and finally and ultimately in a very, very serious thing.

There is plenty of time for us to do it if we start now and keep doing it. That is the reason that I am so delighted that the Advertising Council has directed itself in its efforts along this path.

Governmental officials are busy. They are constantly putting out "fires." They are on the Hill answering why they need this money or that money, or sometimes why they don't need this or that that someone is trying to give to them. This is a new phenomenon, and ordinarily applies only to election year.

The need in government is time to think, with the ability of people to do it. Now by the selection of these people of the Advertising Council they are able to supplement the work of government and so to assist it, to point out new, imaginative ways of how the message of America can be carried.

Promoting Better Understanding

I assure you that that message must be carried, not only in the ways I have indicated but it must be expressed also in the readiness to help wherever possible on good, sound business arrangements. In other words, let us not forget for one instant that, when we are putting \$36 or \$37 billion of expenditures every year into arms and armaments, those arms and armaments alone, remember, can never take us forward—they will merely defend what we have got.

But when you talk about something that promotes a business arrangement—trade—when you can talk about something that promotes a better understanding between us and the people of the Middle East, or the people of Africa, or anybody else, then you are talking about something constructive, something that yields results over the

years to come. It will not be merely something essentially sterile and negative so far as our capacity for raising human standards is concerned. We will not be merely acting like a policeman to protect what we already have. Of course, protection is necessary. It is just as necessary in this day and time as it can possibly be. But let us not make the ignorant, uninformed decision that only in armaments are we going to find the solution of our foreign problems.

And since we have been favored by the system that our forefathers gave us, by the resources that God gave us, by the good fortune we have of having been born and raised here through the finest educational and health systems in the world, and so on, let us use our brains to make certain we sustain our position by helping everybody else to realize their own aspirations and legitimate ambitions. Not necessarily in the exact pattern of this country—of course not. Nobody starts from the same place, and no other nation would possibly reach the same end.

But we can preach and show that we believe in the dignity of man, in the independence of nations, the right of people to determine for themselves their own faith. We can help. Every dollar we put into this kind of thing, if it is intelligently spent, is to my mind, in the long run, worth any five we put just in sheer defense because in the long run it is a constructive thing. It is a developing thing, the kind of development America has done at home and which we must help do abroad.

So, all of these words, all of these thoughts, my friends, give you the depth of my sincerity when I say thank you for coming here, thank you for helping. The people that talk to you today will come not merely to give you a briefing of what they are doing, but in doing so would hope that from you they will get reactions—in other words, what would you do?

Government is nothing but individuals. Every one of the individuals in government belongs to you. He is your "boy" in some form or other. You put him there directly or indirectly. So the job is still that of the American people, and I couldn't conceive of any job in this world being in better hands than that of the American people.

Thank you very much.

Crusade for Freedom

White House press release dated March 27

The following letter from the President was handed by Mrs. Dwight D. Eisenhower to William A. Greene, President of the Crusade for Freedom, in a ceremony at the White House, March 27, 1956.

DEAR MR. GREENE: The captive European peoples behind the Iron Curtain—Poles, Czechoslovaks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Albanians, and residents of the Baltic States—are constantly bombarded by Communist propaganda designed to break their will to resist and destroy their hope for a better future.

In the continuing work of combating such propaganda, Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the Crusade for Freedom, plays a major and effective role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend the hand of friendship and hope to the people behind the Curtain, assuring them that their plight has not been forgotten by the free world and fortifying their devotion to liberty.

To the National Committee for a Free Europe, I extend congratulations on this and the other valuable activities of the organization, with my best wishes for success in enlisting, through the Crusade for Freedom, the support of the American people. I am confident they will respond generously and thus forward this vital work for the cause of freedom and peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting

The White House on April 2 made public the following exchanges of messages, one between President Eisenhower and Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, and the other between the President and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of Mexico.

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister St. Laurent

MARCH 31, 1956

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your warm and thoughtful letter on our meeting with the President of Mexico at White Sulphur Springs.

I hope you enjoyed the occasion as much as I

did, and I am confident that all three of us profited from the friendly and informal talks that we had. These talks will surely bring even closer the intimate relations between our three countries.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable

LOUIS ST. LAURENT

*Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa*

Prime Minister St. Laurent to President Eisenhower

OTTAWA, March 28, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Immediately on my return I want you to know how much I enjoyed our informal meeting and how delighted I was to see you looking so well and in such good spirits.

We had a pleasant, smooth flight home and arrived in Ottawa at 3 p. m.

Thank you for affording me the opportunity of the talks with you and the President of Mexico and may you continue to enjoy your present good health.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS ST. LAURENT

President Eisenhower to President Ruiz Cortines

APRIL 2, 1956

His Excellency

ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES

President of Mexico

I am deeply grateful for the kind message which you so thoughtfully sent me on your return to Mexico City from White Sulphur Springs. It was a source of great satisfaction to me that you and the Prime Minister of Canada found it possible to join me in our recent informal meeting and that you gave me the opportunity to renew our personal friendship. I feel sure that such contact will further strengthen the friendly ties which have so long and happily been maintained through the usual diplomatic interchange.

In extending my every wish for your continued well-being, I renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my personal consideration and highest esteem.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Department of State Bulletin

President Ruiz Cortines to President Eisenhower

MEXICO CITY, *March 29, 1956*

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President of the United States of America

On returning to my country I have the honor to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my deep satisfaction at the friendly personal contacts which upon your happy initiative we have just had at White Sulphur Springs and which inaugurate an era of personal relationship between the American Chiefs of State to the benefit of our countries. I take particular pleasure also in expressing to you my sincere gratitude for the innumerable manifestations which I received of your very cordial hospitality and your sincere and wholehearted friendship. I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my cordial consideration and sincere regards.

ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES

President of the United Mexican States

Letters of Credence

Liberia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, George Arthur Padmore, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 7. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 181.

Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting

Press release 180 dated April 6

The United States has demonstrated in many ways its desire to cooperate in the achievement of the objectives of the Baghdad Pact, which coincide with our objectives in this area and elsewhere—of peace, security, and welfare. While the United States has not itself adhered to the pact, we have, at the request of the members—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom—maintained continuing liaison with the organization and have had observers in attendance at its various meetings.

In line with this policy, the United States is

sending a delegation to the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in Tehran from April 16 to 20. The American delegation will be headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson.

Mr. Henderson will be accompanied to Tehran by a special economic adviser and will be joined by Selden Chapin, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and by Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, together with advisers drawn from the staffs of the American Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad.

The group of U.S. military observers at the meeting will be headed by Adm. John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief of the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Forces, who attended the last meeting of the Council.¹ He will be accompanied by senior representatives of each of the military services.

Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 171 dated April 3

The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is highly significant. It is too early to judge its full meaning, but some important conclusions are now possible.

The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality and personal security, for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed.

Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.

The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust by blaming them on the past? The downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

one man or several. And the new Five-Year Plan shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of the people who are ruled.

In the field of foreign policy the Soviet rulers have taken a few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still subjugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the accepted code of international conduct.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberalizing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change. If the free world retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day.

Visit of French Foreign Minister

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 170 dated April 3

I am very pleased to announce that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Christian Pineau, has accepted an invitation to visit Washington. I have had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some time and first discussed it with Minister Pineau when we met recently at Karachi. The dates for the visit have now been set, and Minister Pineau will be here from June 18 to June 20 inclusive. We will have a further exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. The visit will also provide an occasion for high officials of the United States Government to meet the French Foreign Minister.

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 172 dated April 3

Secretary Dulles: I have two prepared statements to make.¹ . . . Now if you have any questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether there has been any change in our policy on Israel's request for jet fighters and other armaments?

A. The policy in that respect remains substantially as it was when I explained it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about a month ago [February 24].²

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the new version of the Bricker amendment, which is known as the Dirksen version, acceptable to the administration?

A. The President has not made, as far as I am aware, any definite statement on that subject, and until he does I would prefer not myself to speak of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a story out of Tokyo yesterday indicated that the Japanese Embassy here has been directed to protest to the State Department about the enactment of State laws which are apparently designed to boycott Japanese goods. Have you heard of this, first; and, secondly, what can you do about it?

A. Well, I am aware of the problem that you refer to. We have not yet received any protest, as far as I am aware, from the Japanese Government. There is involved a question of trade treaties, discrimination, and there is a possibility of setting up forces here which could be very inimical to the operation of our most-favored-nation policy with respect to trade. But, as I say, until we receive the protest, until we have had a further chance to study the matter in the light of our treaty engagements and in the light of our policies, I wouldn't want to say what our final conclusion will be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a UP report the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, said yesterday that the United States was taking the wrong approach to German unification refusing to put

¹ These statements were also issued separately as press releases 170 (see adjoining column) and 171 (see p. 637).

² BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.

disarmament first. I was wondering whether you have some comment on that.

A. Well, you know, I find as I go around the world, and as I read the papers, that there is a good deal of criticism in other countries, big countries, little countries, of United States policy in various of its phases, and I feel that the fact that those criticisms are made, freely made, is one of the greatest tributes to the United States that could be made. Because all those countries know that they can criticize the United States without any fear of any reprisals or that we will change the principles which actuate us. We are not trying to run a popularity contest, and we don't give or withhold assistance on the basis of whether people say nice things about us or not. I think the finest tribute that could be paid to a country as powerful as the United States is that nobody fears to criticize us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you return to the Bricker amendment? I believe the President said that he was not going to discuss it with us at the press conference until he talked to you about it. Has he talked to you, and have you taken a position on it?

A. Well, he has talked to the Attorney General, but whether he has taken a final position yet, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the legislative status of the Bricker amendment? Does the administration have to decide very soon its position on it?

A. I understand that the present version of the Constitutional amendment has been reported out of committee. I do not think that it is as yet on the calendar, nor do I know what the action will be about whether to put it on the calendar and, if so, when. So that I will just say that as far as I am now aware it is not on the calendar, and it is not a matter of immediate urgency.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the freedom to criticize us seems to have taken a tangible form in Iceland. Could you discuss the resolution of the Icelandic Parliament in favor of moving American forces out of Iceland?

A. Well, I think that the resolution reflects an understandable desire on the part of the Members of Parliament to reduce to a minimum the presence

of foreign troops there. Of course, the resolution itself, as you know, has no operative effect internationally, and I do not anticipate that there will be any decisive action now taken in that matter. Certainly, there is no occasion for any for, I think, a year and a half. But the problem of Iceland has always been a difficult one because Iceland is a quite small country. It has a population of, I think, about 160,000, and in that small population even a modest amount of forces from a foreign land makes a considerable impact. If you were to put it into relative terms, I would say that the situation is as though there were 6,000,000 foreign, non-English-speaking troops in the United States. Well, as the years go by there would, naturally, grow up a desire perhaps to reduce that, and a desire to be sure that the Government did not continue it beyond the time that it was necessary. There is, I think, a feeling in Iceland that perhaps the recent Soviet moves make this less necessary. Undoubtedly, that whole problem will be discussed over the coming months. But I do not think that it is reflective of anything other than a desire to minimize the presence of foreign troops insofar as it can safely be done. The question of how safely it can be done is a matter which would probably be discussed at some of our NATO meetings.

Situation in Near East

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you discuss your views on the present situation in the Middle East with respect to the chances of avoiding a war?

A. It is, of course, basic to United States policy, first, that war in that area should be avoided, and, secondly, that nothing should happen to subvert the genuine independence of the countries of that area. Peace and independence for that area are two basic points of our policy.

I have the feeling that the resolution which is up before the Security Council now, and which was introduced by the United States, will contribute appreciably to minimizing the risk of war in the area.³

When I spoke on this subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time that I have already alluded to, I emphasized my thought that the United Nations had a very peculiar responsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of

³ See p. 628.

peace, because the State of Israel had to an extent been sponsored by the United Nations and the truce and armistice agreements had been sponsored by the United Nations. I felt, therefore, that the United Nations should assume increasing responsibility.

The resolution that we introduced, if it is adopted, as I am hopeful it will be (perhaps today or more likely tomorrow), will, I think, add appreciably to the assurance of peace in that part of the world, and to that extent it will mark, I think, real progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the British Foreign Office has criticized Premier Nasser of Egypt on the ground that he has become rather anti-Western and has particularly made difficulties for Britain and France in the area. Are you aware of any such conduct on Nasser's part?

A. In so far as I have been aware of Nasser's public and official statements, I would say that he was actuated primarily by a desire to maintain the genuine independence of the area—the same desire that I expressed. Of course, it is never possible to make final judgments merely on the basis of what people say. But I am not disposed to feel that there is any irrevocable decision on the part of the Government of Egypt to repudiate its ties with the West or to accept anything like vassalage to the Soviet Union.

Q. May I ask one more question on this area: There have been reports published within the last day or so that the United States Government is considering separating from Israel's arms requests certain requests for electronic equipment, chiefly radar, and approving that on the ground that it is purely defensive. Can you comment on these reports?

A. No, I'm afraid not. If that analysis is under way, it is at a level which hasn't yet come to my attention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to your previous answer, does your answer mean that Israel's arms requests have been turned down?

A. No.

Q. Does it mean they are still open?

A. I would have to ask you to let me stand pretty much on the statement which I made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public

hearing about a month ago. My difficulty, ladies and gentlemen, is this: that whenever I speak on that subject I find that every single word and phrase that I use is compared very, very closely with something I may have said a month ago, and if I don't use precisely the same words then it is inferred that we have changed our policy.

Now it is not possible for me—my memory isn't good enough—to repeat exactly in verbatim terms what I said a month ago. And if I try to repeat it in approximately the same terms, that wouldn't be good enough because the differences, however slight, would be studied with a view to seeing if they don't hide some change of policy.

Now, broadly speaking, our policy is as I expressed it at that time, and I think rather than attempt to restate it in what might be slightly different words from which inferences might unjustifiably be drawn, I would just rather stand on that previous statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to tell us who makes this interpretation?

A. I would say that those interpretations—I am not criticizing them—those interpretations are made by the interested parties who, quite properly, are seeking to detect, if possible, any changes in our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please comment on the exception that the Netherlands appears to have taken to some of your statements in Djakarta?

A. Well, I had a friendly talk, yesterday I think it was, with the Dutch Ambassador here and, I think, clarified the situation. I believe that the position which I took at Djakarta was a position which, by and large, is in the interest of the United States and all of the free nations, and I hope that there will be a better understanding of what I said and did there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment specifically on the Jungschlaeger⁴ case, particularly the charge that an American Embassy plane had been used to fly ammunition to the rebels?

A. It is not our practice to comment in general upon cases that are pending before courts. There are a great many of these cases all around the

⁴ Leon Jungschlaeger, retired Dutch naval captain on trial in Indonesia for alleged subversive activities against the Indonesian Government.

world, and, in the main, it is our policy to avoid comment on cases either at home or abroad that are pending before the courts. As far as the reference to the use of a United States plane is concerned, I understand that has been publicly and officially denied by the United States Embassy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [in executive session on March 23] you spoke of the Japanese talking about the use of American foreign aid to help them in their payments program both in the United States and Asia. Has anything further developed on that?

A. No. That theme has been reported by me to our economic people here in the State Department and to the ICA [International Cooperation Administration], and they are studying it to see what they may conclude as to feasibility of a practical application of that general thesis that we should seek to coordinate our economic aid with such economic aid as may result from Japanese reparation payments and the like.

Free-World Unity

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement you said something about if the free world maintains its unity in the face of the Soviet changes. We talked a lot here about criticism from a variety of nations. Do you have any apprehensions the free world will maintain its unity in the face of the Soviet change?

A. I am convinced that the free world will maintain its unity. Now unity is something which has to be carefully differentiated from conformity. That is the difference between our system and the Soviet Communist system—at least, as it has been expounded up to the present time. Whether they will change that or not I don't know. But the old Soviet Communist line has been that there had to be complete conformity and that no differences of opinion were tolerated. In a free society the situation is the reverse of that. We tolerate and welcome differences of opinion, and, indeed, if there were no differences of opinion in a free society there would be something badly wrong with it. Therefore, the unity and vigor of a free society is not to be judged by the absence of criticism and comments; on the contrary, I think it is a sign of vigor that these comments and criticisms occur.

Now, there is of course some danger always that a change of tactics such as is now going on in the Soviet Union, where—as I put it—it may be that old policies are merely being masked, may temporarily have a deceptive effect. But one of the encouraging impressions that I gained from my trip to Asia is that there is a very large measure of alertness to the possibility of danger from new Soviet tactics. Therefore, I returned from this trip convinced that, at least in so far as that part of the world was concerned, there is a very good hope that the unity of the free nations will be preserved. Not, as I say, in the form of a conformity, or domination, or some nations being satellites to others—goodness knows we don't want any satellites. But the kind of unity which means that they are free from Soviet Communist or Chinese Communist domination and within that freedom each lives its own independent life. I believe that situation is going to prevail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the United States would not oppose other Western countries selling arms to Israel. Would you explain to us the difference—whether the arms come from the United States or other Western countries?

A. The United States is following its policy in relation to that area for reasons that seem to us to be most conducive to our particular ability to exert influence for the peace and independence of the area of which I spoke. But the same considerations which apply to the United States do not necessarily apply to other countries, and there is certainly no desire on the part of the United States to dictate to other countries what their policy should be.

Policy on Use of Troops

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject how do you interpret the May 25, 1950, declaration in so far as it may involve the use of our own troops to put down any acts of aggression in that part of the world? Are you free, for example, without congressional sanction?

A. Whether we are free or not is a Constitutional question. It is very strongly the disposition of President Eisenhower, as I think you all know, to resolve any of those doubts in favor of going to Congress, assuming that Congress is in session and can be expected to act promptly, or

could be called into session promptly. I would think that, in the absence of an emergency of such a character, congressional consultation and action would be impractical and the President would not be disposed to act without such consultation and concurrence by the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't the 1950 declaration commit Britain, France, and the United States to follow a common policy?

A. It laid down certain principles which each accepted as a broad guide to its policies. Those principles were, however, so general in their terms that it is not easy to apply them to particulars, and of course the situation has changed since that time in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is now a large purveyor of arms in that area.

Q. Would the consultations you were talking about be of the kind that took place before the Korean War or at the time the Korean War occurred with congressional leaders, or are you speaking of some other kind of consultations with Congress?

A. Well, I thought I coupled two words—I thought I said consultation and approval, although possibly if Congress was not in session and an emergency arose then there might be consultations alone. But I would think, in the light of what the President has said in the past, that he would not normally expect to use the armed forces of the United States in the area where there has been no congressional approval given either through a resolution or through a treaty.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government believe that the shipment of some small arms to Israel by other countries would contribute to the stability of the area?

A. It might do so. That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, but certainly the United States has no view to the contrary which would lead it to interpose any objections.

"Problems of Leninism"

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been indicated to us in the past you regarded Stalin's Problems of Leninism as one of the basic texts in Soviet policy. I wonder if recent events would lead you to subscribe to that in the light of recent events.

A. I still have it on my desk both here and at my house because, in so far as I am aware, the

Soviets, while they have attempted to disavow much of Stalin's program and many of his acts, have not themselves come up with any substitute. There is this to be observed—that the portion of Stalin's rule which is apparently being most vigorously disavowed is, roughly speaking, the last 20 years. The *Problems of Leninism* runs up—as I recall—to 1939, and most of the book embraces statements, speeches, etc., made by Stalin prior to 1937. It may be, therefore, that the greater part of that book will be preserved. Certainly, I don't think one is justified in assuming that it all will go, particularly as the book purports in large part to be a statement of Lenin's doctrine.

Lenin wrote so voluminously that one can delve into his books and arrive at almost any conclusion you wish by picking and choosing. Stalin picked and chose, but much of the book is a quotation from or an elucidation of Lenin's writings. Therefore, I think it is not possible yet to conclude that that volume, or the greater part of it, may not be preserved as a working model for the Communists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government ever been able to get hold of the text or a summary of the secret Khrushchev speech or any party instructions on which you perhaps based your original statements?

A. We have not as yet been able to get a full text or written excerpts from it. We do think we have, through indirection, a pretty good idea as to what was said there. But obviously it is incomplete because it was a very long speech and the recollections which we are able to draw upon are secondhand and somewhat fragmentary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, about Premier Nasser's statement, how do you regard Premier Nasser's statement in the New York Times that he still was weighing the Soviet offer to build the Aswan dam; secondly, are you aware of a change in heart in Egypt in making a prompt start on the dam?

A. In so far as I am aware, there is no program for making a prompt start, and, indeed, some of the preconditions to a start are still under discussion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reply to an earlier question you said that you thought the President would want congressional approval by either a resolution or a treaty in order to use forces in some foreign area—

A. In the absence of an emergency in which the national interest was involved, and there wasn't time to get congressional action.

Q. I would like to ask a question. Do you have any plan or does the President have a plan to ask Congress for such a resolution applying to the Middle East or, alternatively, do you know of any emergency which might require action in the absence of congressional approval?

A. I will answer those questions in reverse order because it is easier. The first is that we do not know of any such emergency, and since we do not know of it we do not have any present plans to seek congressional action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you said, I believe, in answer to a question that Israel's request for arms has not been turned down. Has the United States decided to meet this request on the part of Israel?

A. No, it has not made an affirmative decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you said regarding Stalin's writings on Problems of Leninism, are you implying there is primarily a change of methodology in the Soviet administration and, if so, could not a change of methodology, willingly or unwillingly, lead to a change of substance in their policies?

A. Yes, I believe so, and that is the basis for the hope which I expressed in the next-to-last sentence of the statement which I read to you.

U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the friction between the Netherlands and the United States, could you answer these two questions: A Christian Science Monitor editorial recently suggested that the United States should be careful not to take over economic responsibilities in Indonesia where the Netherlands is forced to leave off, and the second question is this: There is a growing sentiment in the Netherlands that the neutrality of the United States regarding Netherlands New Guinea is about to be over. Could you comment on that one?

A. Well, as far as economic assistance is concerned, the United States has no desire or intention of taking over the Dutch industrial position in

Indonesia, if that is the subject of your question. Indonesia was a colony, and there was a very large amount of Netherlands capital which was in there. There is no desire or purpose on the part of the United States, governmentally or through encouraging private business, to take over that dominant economic position which the Dutch enjoyed.

We are giving a certain amount of economic assistance to Indonesia. Just before I was there we signed a Public Law 480 arrangement with Indonesia which involved approximately \$95 million worth of agricultural surplus goods.⁵ So we are sympathetic to assisting Indonesia where it desires such assistance. But certainly we do not expect to take over the Dutch commercial position in Indonesia.

I think there were two parts of that question. I have forgotten what the second part was.

Q. It concerned Netherlands New Guinea. So far the United States delegation to the United Nations, at least in recent years, has taken a position of absolute neutrality. Some fears are being expressed that is no longer the case.

A. We expect to continue to take a position of neutrality because that is our general policy with relation to these highly controversial matters which involve countries both of whom are friends and where we ourselves are not directly involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what does the administration expect Congress will do on long-range foreign aid programs? Are you doing anything about it—trying to sell the idea?

A. Yes, I am doing a good deal publicly and privately. You will find I made two public speeches of a nationwide character, within the last 6 weeks I think, which dealt with that subject.⁶ I emphasized it in my appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees after I returned, and I have talked privately to a number of Senators and Congressmen about it. My belief is that there will be congressional action in this respect which will enable us to go forward on long-range projects with confidence.

⁵ BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

⁶ Ibid., Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

This coming Wednesday it will be exactly 7 years since that April 4, 1949, when the representatives of 12 nations gathered in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. It is fitting that we pause on this occasion to see what progress we have made and to look forward to some of the problems facing the Atlantic community.

It is particularly fitting that this symposium be held here in Norfolk. Your city is one of the first to which our ancestors came from across the Atlantic 300 years ago. Today Norfolk may be described as one of the capitals of the Atlantic community, since one of NATO's two major integrated command systems is located here. The other is the NATO headquarters in Paris. Just 2 weeks ago I had a chance to talk over the situation in Europe with General [Alfred M.] Gruenther, the Supreme Commander for Europe stationed in Paris, and I look forward today to renewing my long acquaintance with Admiral [Jerauld] Wright, the distinguished Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic.

We in Washington feel special gratitude to the College of William and Mary and to the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce for your sponsorship of these meetings—the one last August and the one beginning today—on the organization and purposes of NATO. Through this kind of discussion and study we will all better understand one of our country's most important activities in the international field. By your example you can help other Americans appreciate the significance of our Atlantic alliance.

¹ Address made at a symposium on NATO sponsored by the College of William and Mary and the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce at Norfolk, Va., on Apr. 2 (press release 168).

This symposium is an important step in that direction, and I am honored that you asked me to introduce your valuable discussions. Rather than dwell on the general outline of NATO's organization and development, with which we are fairly well acquainted, we might talk about some of the principles and concepts which lie behind the North Atlantic Treaty and some of the reasons why NATO has become a vital force in world affairs.

It is important that we keep in mind these fundamental facts about our Atlantic alliance. We will then be better able to meet some of the questions we have been hearing recently about NATO. And it is worth remembering that much of the talk about NATO comes from greater public interest and a wider knowledge about our security problems. This is all to the good and in our national interest.

All of us are familiar with some of the doubts and questions raised during the last few months. Some people complain that the United States is devoting a great deal of money and manpower to protecting Europe and is not getting enough in return. Others argue that NATO—and in fact the whole concept of collective security—is being rendered obsolete by the development of the hydrogen bomb and other weapons of massive destruction. Still others suggest that the recent shift in Soviet tactics has greatly lessened the danger of war and therefore reduced the need for programs and relationships which have developed through NATO.

In my opinion, all these doubts and questions have their roots in misconceptions about the premises of the Atlantic alliance and about the true character of the international situation now con-

fronting this country. The best way to clear up these misconceptions is to take a good look at NATO's background—to review some of the basic considerations which led to its formation and which make it so valuable today.

NATO has not arisen from a single foundation but rather from several firm-bedded foundations. The main building blocks of NATO are three: the awareness of a common heritage, the presence of a common danger, and a common determination to resist it. These three elements have blended to provide a solid basis for the most extensive and most powerful association of free peoples that history has ever known.

A Common Heritage

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of what we might call the "human" foundations of NATO. By this, I refer to the multiplicity of spiritual, cultural, and personal ties that link the North Atlantic peoples. We should always remember that NATO did not create the Atlantic community. Rather, it was the fact that a community already existed which made NATO possible. The common heritage underlying NATO began nearly 500 years ago with the voyages of discovery and exploration, and the passing centuries have steadily tightened the attachment of North America to Europe. Let me give you a few examples.

According to the 1950 census, there were more than 33 million people living in the United States who either were born abroad or had parents born abroad. Of this number, nearly half came from the 14 other NATO countries. Of the remainder of our population, an even larger percentage can trace their ancestry back to one of the NATO nations.

We Americans have developed over the years a political and constitutional structure that is peculiarly our own. But its basic principles, including representative government, restraints on governmental authority, and guaranties of human and property rights, had European origins. Most of our European allies, despite varying political structures, still govern themselves under these basic principles. In simple terms, we and our allies share a devotion to the concepts of human freedom and political liberty. These concepts are what set the free nations apart in the world today.

A look at the content of our educational programs shows even more concretely our common

heritage with Western and Southern Europe. Here at William and Mary, the second oldest university in the country and one of our best, we find as in other American universities numerous studies in literature, science, art, and the social sciences. If we forget for a moment the portion of this accumulated knowledge that has been produced by the minds and hands of our own countrymen, we will quickly recognize that the greatest part of the remainder has come from the NATO countries of Europe. Our whole culture is an Atlantic culture.

It would be possible to offer many additional examples, but those I have given are sufficient to illustrate my thesis that the Atlantic community was a living reality long before the relationship was formalized by intergovernmental organizations. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of this community relationship was provided by our experience in the First and Second World Wars. In both instances the American people, after trying to avoid involvement in military hostilities, discovered painfully that the fate of Europe was indissolubly linked with our own. The bonds of blood, friendship, and tradition are not easily broken.

A Common Danger

In the period after 1945, another crisis arose. This danger threatened every one of the Atlantic nations. The Nazi dream of world empire was shattered, but in the process a large part of the Eurasian land mass fell into the hands of the ruthless Communist dictatorship. Within a matter of months, Western hopes that the Soviet Union would restore freedom to the areas occupied by its armies and would cooperate in the establishing of a lasting peace were dashed.

Not only did the Soviet rulers make clear their determination to hold fast to their conquests and to exploit the newly acquired resources and peoples for the aggrandizement of Soviet power, but they made equally clear their intention to continue the expansion of Communist power into other areas. Moreover, it was evident that the Communist bloc possessed powerful capabilities for carrying out these intentions. The external pressures of Soviet imperialism were reinforced by the internal pressures exerted by pro-Communist elements within free societies. Guns were supplemented by propaganda. The specter of political chaos was magnified by the risk of economic col-

lapse. Communism attacked on all fronts at the same time. Its purpose was to destroy every vestige of resistance to a Communist-dominated world. The situation in 1948 and 1949 was desperate. Something had to be done.

A Common Response

The common civilization of the Atlantic community was challenged by a common danger, and this inspired a common response. The Atlantic nations cooperated in various ways to meet the danger. Through the Marshall plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, they labored to restore Western Europe's economic health and thereby lay a basis for political stability. Through the Brussels Treaty, five European nations began the construction of a common defense system. But it was painfully evident that even the utmost toil and sacrifice on the part of the Brussels Treaty powers would not be adequate to produce defenses capable of holding the Soviet colossus in check. Just as North American support had proved necessary to European economic recovery, so did North American participation prove essential to an effective defense arrangement. The North Atlantic Treaty was the result.

The North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated by the United States and the 11 other original signatories: Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. Since that time Greece, Turkey, and most recently the Federal Republic of Germany have acceded to the treaty, making a total of 15 members. The main deterrent to aggression, completely apart from the military strength which was later assembled, lay in the unity of purpose which the treaty demonstrated. Secretary Dulles, then a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, clearly set forth this view when, during the hearings on the ratification of the treaty, he said:

The treaty takes away from an aggressor one choice that he used to have: the choice of making war on the parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the same time.

The Principle of Collective Security

It is clear that the common danger confronting the Atlantic nations provided the immediate stimulus for NATO. But the existence of a com-

mon danger is only a part of the story. Even more important is the fact that the Atlantic powers, *in combination*, possess a capacity for responding to this danger far greater than any one of them possesses alone. Of all the tangible and intangible elements that have joined together to produce NATO, the most significant is the simple fact that Western Europe and Northern America need each other—that an amalgamation of their human and material resources is vital to the safety and well-being of both.

Since the end of World War II, there has been little question in the minds of most Europeans about the need for American cooperation and support. Most of them have found it painfully obvious that collective security is the only real security available. But among Americans the need for Europe's cooperation and support is sometimes less clearly understood. Old-style isolationism has virtually died out in America, but there are still a number of our people who are inclined to doubt that we get much out of collective security arrangements and who suspect that the United States protects and assists others while receiving little or nothing in return. This is a fallacy and probably engenders more mistaken thinking about foreign policy than any other single misconception. I think it would be useful, therefore, to examine the strategic value of the combination of NATO resources primarily from the standpoint of America's own national self-interests.

Stripped to its essence, the justification for NATO is a simple exercise in elementary arithmetic. North America and free Europe combined now produce about 70 percent of the world's manufactured goods, while the entire Soviet bloc, including China, produces only about 20 percent. On the other hand, Soviet control of the territory and resources of Western Europe would give the Soviet bloc 50 percent of the total world's industrial production, as against North America's 40 percent. The Atlantic nations, so long as they are joined together, are in a position to maintain decisive industrial superiority over the Soviet bloc for an indefinite period of years. Soviet domination of Western Europe would rapidly shift the industrial balance to the Communist side.

One of our great deficiencies in the global struggle with communism is manpower. The population of the Communist bloc outnumbers the American population by a margin of 5 to 1. But with free Europe and North America joined together,

this margin is reduced to approximately 2 to 1. The extent to which the manpower of our European allies supplements the manpower of the United States is vividly illustrated by the armed forces of the two areas. The United States has about 3 million men under arms. Our NATO allies are now adding another $3\frac{1}{2}$ million to the total military manpower available for free-world defense. We do not know exactly how many men the Communist countries have under arms, but a fair estimate would be about $10\frac{1}{4}$ million.

Our European allies also contribute substantial sea and air strength, as well as naval and air bases, to the common defense. There are now more than 150 NATO air bases in the European area. These bases are indispensable for defense and retaliation against aggression. We should note that our NATO allies have not only contributed the land for these bases but have paid most of the cost of their construction.

Not the least of free Europe's potential contributions to the strength and well-being of the Atlantic community is Europe's scientific and technological capacity. It is worth recalling the nationalities of the scientists who contributed to the original development of the atomic bomb. The list reads almost like a NATO rolloall; for example, Fermi of Italy, Bohr of Denmark, Cockcroft of England.

Finally, I think it is time to lay at rest the myth that the cost of the NATO program rests primarily upon the shoulders of the American taxpayer. It is true that our defense expenditures are much greater than those of other countries, but it is also true that our national income is nearly three times as great as that of all the other NATO nations combined. Americans know that the United States has made very large contributions to the equipment and training of the military forces of our European allies. But relatively few Americans realize that these allies are now spending \$6 from their own budget to match every dollar's worth of U.S. assistance they receive from us. All told, they are contributing about \$12 billion a year to the common defense program. And \$12 billion "ain't hay," even in this age of astronomical budgets. It is a very substantial contribution to the common defense.

These are some of the facts which explain the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty and why it is important to us. And just as significant as the series of commitments which the member nations

have given to assist one another in the event of aggression is the wide range of collective activity in which they are already engaged. While most of this activity is directed toward the maintenance and improvement of military defense, there have been significant advances toward closer political and cultural cooperation as well.

NATO, with its 15 members, is a cornerstone of our foreign policy, linking the power of North America with that of Western and Southern Europe. We have other important alliances. In this hemisphere we have the Organization of American States, the oldest regional system in the world, and the Rio Pact, which bind us together with 20 Latin American Republics for cooperation and joint defense. In Asia we are members of SEATO, still a new organization, which is steadily gathering strength. We have important bilateral pacts with the Republic of China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain, and we have a trilateral security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. today is fortified by security arrangements with more than 40 countries. Although we are not members of the Baghdad Pact, which is the very newest defense organization, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, we have a deep interest in its success. The United States has entered into these defense alliances to meet the danger we and our friends face in many parts of the world. Our ability to meet this danger is much more powerful than it was even a few years ago. But the danger has not significantly abated.

Shift in Soviet Tactics

This is true even though during the last year we have witnessed what appears to be a rather striking shift in Soviet tactics. While the Communist leaders have always employed a variety of techniques to pursue their objective of world domination, up until recently they had relied largely on the use or threatened use of military force. As a result of the increasing unity and strength of free nations, there are indications that they have now reached a better appreciation of the suicidal risks of warfare and are beginning to place much more emphasis on the use of political, economic, and psychological techniques in the unending Communist struggle against the free world.

There is a lot we still do not know about what is going on in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are changing their policies. In certain vital areas like the unification of Germany, they appear to have made no change. On the other hand, they appear to be trying to change their approach and diplomatic methods, particularly as they deal with South Asia and the Near East. They seem to be stepping up their overtures toward Western Europe. Toward Japan, however, they are still using the heavy hand and their old technique of diplomatic coercion. They have not in the slightest relaxed their control over the satellite nations.

The Stalin story is currently the most spectacular example of the Soviet enigma. We know that Stalin's disciples and collaborators are now blackening his name. *Pravda*, on March the 28th, told the world that Stalin lacked personal modesty, that he did not cut short the glorifications and praises addressed to him, and that all this violated the principles of Marx and Lenin, who, according to *Pravda*, taught that the people must have the right to elect their responsible leaders.

There are a lot of good reasons why the present Soviet rulers would want to push Stalin off his pedestal. They may well have found it necessary to revitalize the political and economic machinery of the Soviet Union, and by attacking Stalin they may hope to shock the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union into an awareness that a new response is expected, that the people on down the line in the Soviet hierarchy must take on greater initiative and responsibility. They probably want to stimulate the productive and creative abilities of Soviet engineers, scientists, and artists, who were never sure that Stalin might not change the line and put them out of business. And we cannot forget that the men in Moscow probably feared the wrath of Stalin, knowing what they knew about the purges and the secret police. They may also feel this new line will be appealing to non-Communists and especially to socialists abroad, and that it will get them out from under the domineering rigidities of Stalin's foreign policy.

Time will tell us more about the "cult of the individual" and about the adjustments going on in Russia.

It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that the Communists have changed their objective. We

have almost no evidence that the basic totalitarian features of the Soviet state have changed in any way. Nevertheless, we can hope that they have decided to reduce their emphasis on military strength and threat of force as major instruments of policy. Such a shift would be an advantageous development from the standpoint of the United States and other free nations. The objective of U.S. policy is to achieve in peace the blessings of liberty, and thus any genuine indication that the danger of armed Communist aggression has diminished would be welcome. We have no reason to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies to compete with communism by peaceful means. At the same time, there are two things we should keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out where we stand today.

Communist Capability for Aggression

First, we should remember that the Communist bloc still retains a tremendous *capability* for military aggression. It has a substantial superiority in military manpower. It is rapidly developing more modern weapons and a modern technology, including an ominous atomic potential. The Communists possess the capacity to engage in new military adventures at any time, either on a general or local scale. As long as this *capacity* exists, it is obvious that the United States and other free nations must be watchful of their freedom and safety.

Second, even if the Communists remain cautious about military adventures, we cannot afford to discount the enormous stakes involved in the bitter political and economic contest which they are determined to continue waging against the free world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization, this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old. In some ways, it is even more difficult to combat, because it is more subtle, more complex, and geared to a longer time period. We should not make the fatal mistake of assuming that a seeming Communist de-emphasis of military methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday from the struggle for freedom. On the contrary, this struggle may become more intense and will certainly tax our imagination, energy, and patience to the utmost. Our ability to achieve success in this struggle, like our ability to maintain an adequate defense posture, will depend in large measure upon our cooperation with other free nations. The principle of collective security is as valid to-

day in the political field as it ever was in the military field.

I think it is clear that the NATO countries have no reason to de-emphasize their defense programs. Actually, these very programs have been a principal factor in bringing about the recent shift in Soviet tactics. Our current situation reminds me of a story I once heard about a highway that went through a mountain village. There was a very high cliff at a sharp turn in the highway, and quite a number of travelers failed to make it. There was considerable agitation for a project to build a fence at this point, and this was eventually done. After several years had gone by, however, a traveler happened to be passing through the village and noticed that the fence had been removed. He stopped to ask one of the natives about it and received a very simple explanation. "We kept the fence there for about 3 years," the old fellow said, "but nobody fell off the cliff any more, so we took it down."

Maintaining Our Guard

I feel sure that both the United States and its allies recognize that this is no time to take down our fences. We must maintain our guard as long as a threat exists. Even though we hope that the Soviet rulers have come to recognize the horrors of modern warfare, we have no guaranty that they will indefinitely desist from military adventures, especially if they are tempted by military weaknesses in neighboring nations.

As I said in the beginning of this discussion, this examination of NATO's background will help us to give positive answers to any of the doubts or questions raised about the NATO relationship. NATO remains vital to the interests of Americans and Europeans alike. The onrush of modern technology has not lessened the need for collective strength and collective effort. The new wind blowing from Moscow remains chilly. We must always be prepared for stormy weather.

To those who express concern about the occasional differences of opinion among our NATO allies, I would like to say this. I have never known even a closely knit family that did not have an occasional quarrel. There will be disagreement among individuals and nations as long as independent thinking survives, and independence of thought is one of the things we Americans and our allies are most determined to preserve. It is true, of course, that frictions and disagree-

ments could weaken the effectiveness of an alliance. We must do everything we can to minimize and resolve differences of this kind, but we must never exaggerate their importance. Even the most important differences among the Atlantic nations cannot begin to match the significance of our common interest in peace and survival.

I do not propose at this time to speculate about the direction which NATO may take in future years. You here today, with your interest and expert knowledge about NATO, are well qualified to do this. I will confine myself, in conclusion, to expressing my deep conviction that the Atlantic relationship, whatever the fluctuations of circumstance, will endure and grow. NATO's foundations are solid, and its accomplishments are substantial. I know that you here in Norfolk will continue your efforts to help it grow even stronger.

NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman

The Department of State announced on April 4 (press release 173) that M. Margaret Ball, professor of political science, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., is the U.S. winner of one of the 11 NATO research fellowships offered by the North Atlantic Council. Simultaneous announcement of the award was made at NATO headquarters in Paris.

The NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program was announced last July in implementation of article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for cooperation in nonmilitary fields. It is designed to promote the study of historical, political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which will reveal the common heritage and historical experience of the Atlantic countries, as well as the present needs and future development of the North Atlantic area considered as a community. Candidates for these first awards to be made under the program were selected by a committee under the chairmanship of Ambassador L. D. Wilgress, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, who is also chairman of the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Other members of the committee were James B. Conant, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and formerly president of Harvard University; Robert Marjolin, professor at Nancy University and formerly Secretary-General of the Organiza-

tion for European Economic Cooperation; Alberto Tarchiani, formerly Italian Ambassador to the United States; and H. U. Willink, master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly vice-chancellor of Cambridge University. The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils assisted the Department in recommending a panel of American candidates to be considered by the selection committee.

Miss Ball's research will be on the general subject of NATO and the Western European union movement. She expects to leave this coming autumn to spend the 4-month period of the fellowship in London, Paris, Bonn, and other European capitals.

U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport Agreement

Press release 176 dated April 5

The Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States began negotiation of an air transport agreement in Washington on April 5.

The chairman of the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is Dr. J. J. Spanjaard, Director of the Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation. The delegation also includes representatives of the Governments of Surinam and of the Netherlands Antilles. The opening session was also attended by the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States, Dr. J. H. van Roijen.

Chairman of the U.S. delegation is Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The vice chairman is Har-mar Denny, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The U.S. delegation is composed of officials from the Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

There has never been a bilateral air transport agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. At present Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) operates from Amsterdam to New York and from Curaçao to Miami under permits granted directly to the airline by the U.S. Government. Similarly, Pan American Airways operates from New York to Amsterdam and beyond to Frankfurt, Germany, from New York to Surinam and beyond, and from New York and Miami to Cu-

raçao and beyond under permits granted directly to the airline by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State

White House press release dated March 24

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

President Eisenhower on March 24 issued an Executive order authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out the functions pertaining to the United States Escapee Program through any officer or agency of the Department of State.¹ It is contemplated that this program, which is presently being administered by the International Cooperation Administration, will be transferred to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in the Department of State. The Escapee Program is designed to provide immediate assistance for people fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain and for their eventual reestablishment in Europe or overseas. During its 4 years of operation the program has assisted nearly 25,000 persons to resettle in the free world.

The contemplated transfer will consolidate this humanitarian program with the related refugee functions already administered by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. The Deputy Administrator of the Bureau, who is responsible for the administration of the Refugee Relief Program, will also direct the Escapee Program and represent the United States on the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

Within the International Cooperation Administration the Office of the Deputy Director for Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistance has been abolished. Those functions in this field which remain the responsibility of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy Director for Technical Services. These functions are concerned with registration of and relationships with U.S. voluntary agencies which participate in international relief and rehabilitation proj-

¹ For an article on the Escapee Program by Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 415.

ects, and with staff support for the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

This change was recommended by a joint State-ICA task force studying organizational relationships concerning these activities. The proposed transfer has the approval of the Secretary of State and the full concurrence of John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10663 ²

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESCAPEE PROGRAM

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, including particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, it is ordered as follows:

SEC. 1. Section 104 of Executive Order No. 10610 of May 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3181),³ is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection (c) reading as follows:

"(c) The Secretary of State may carry out the functions now financed pursuant to section 405 (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, through any officer or agency of the Department of State."

SEC. 2. There is hereby terminated the duty of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (under section 103 (c) of Executive Order No. 10575 of November 6, 1954 (19 F. R. 7251)),⁴ as affected by Executive Order No. 10610) to assist the Secretary of State in formulating and presenting the policy of the United States with respect to the assistance programs of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the United Nations Refugee Fund, and the United Nations Children's Fund.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to transfer or assign to any agency or agencies of the Department of State such offices, officers, and personnel, and so much of the property and records, of the International Cooperation Administration as he may deem necessary for the administration by the said agency or agencies of the functions referred to in section 104 (c) of Executive Order No. 10610, as amended by this order.

SEC. 4. This order shall become effective on the first day of the first month commencing after the date hereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 24, 1956.

² 21 Fed. Reg. 1845.

³ BULLETIN of May 30, 1955, p. 889.

⁴ Ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914.

April 16, 1956

Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee

Press release 177 dated April 6

The Department of State announced on April 6 the appointment of the following persons to serve as members of an advisory committee to the Foreign Service Institute:

Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U. S. House of Representatives
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red Cross

Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Robert Cutler, Director, Old Colony Trust, Boston, Mass.
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social Sciences, Harvard University

William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University

Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York, N.Y.

Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, Columbia University

The Foreign Service Institute has statutory responsibility for training in the Department of State. It is concerned with indoctrination and training of newly commissioned Foreign Service officers in the intricacies of a diplomatic and consular career and also with the responsibility of preparing officers in mid-career for positions of greater importance in the Service. Additionally, the Institute provides training in many languages, conducts courses in economics and administration, and is responsible for university assignments in pursuit of greater proficiency in such areas as political science, management, and economics. It also furnishes to other officers and employees of the Government such training in the field of foreign relations as is needed.

The committee will meet periodically for the purpose of advising the Director of the Institute on all phases of training.

Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin

Press release 169 dated April 3

Final arrangements have now been completed to permit the opening of negotiations for the settlement of the external debts owed by the City of Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin.

These arrangements amplify the agreement referred to in the Department of State's press release 8 of January 5, 1956,¹ which lifted the restrictions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on German External Debts of February 27, 1953,² on the settlement of the Berlin external debts. The arrangements were made in similar exchanges of notes between the United States, British, and French Embassies at Bonn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. The text of the note sent by the United States Embassy to the Foreign Ministry and an unofficial translation of the reply follow.

Note From U.S. Embassy at Bonn

No. 386

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note number 507-519-746-71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, and to the Embassy's note number 94 of August 29, 1955 on the subject of the settlement of the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises.

In the opinion of the United States Government, the exchange of notes referred to constitutes the agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agreement that negotiations on the settlement of these debts are now considered to be practicable. The Ministry has now raised informally with the British, French and American Embassies the question of the form of the negotiations provided for in Article 5 (5).

The United States Government considers that, with the lifting of the exclusion provided in Article 5 (5), the terms of the London Debt Agreement and the appropriate annexes are applicable to the settlement of the external debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises; and in particular, that the external bonded debts of the City of Berlin fall under Annex I, the bonded debts of the public utilities under Annex II and the miscellaneous debts of the City and of the public utilities, under Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no further intergovernmental conference is required, but that negotiations may now be undertaken between the debtors and the creditor representatives.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 93.

² S. Exec. D, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

The question of the actual terms of settlement of these debts will naturally be one of the principal objects of the proposed negotiations. The United States Government believes that the text of the Agreement and the annexes provides ample flexibility to take into account the special political and economic position of Berlin.

If the Federal Government is in agreement with the views presented above, it is suggested that this note, the identical notes from the British and French Embassies and the replies of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs constitute an interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and that certified copies of these notes be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

AMERICAN EMBASSY, Bonn, Bad Godesberg, February 29, 1956.

Note Verbale From German Foreign Ministry

507-519-746-5-5-73835/56

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge to the Embassy of the United States of America the receipt of its Note Verbale No. 386 of February 29, 1956 concerning the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises and to reply as follows with reference to the Note Verbale of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of August 13, 1955—507-519-746-71284/55—and to the Note of the Embassy of the United States of America of August 29, 1955—No. 94—concerning the same subject:

In the opinion of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany the exchange of notes mentioned above constitutes the agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agreement that negotiations on the settlement of these debts are now considered to be expedient. The Embassy of the United States of America, the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy have in the meantime informally discussed with the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the question of the form in which the negotiations provided for in Article 5 (5) are to take place.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers that, after the lifting of the deferment provided by Article 5 (5), the terms of the London Debt Agreement and the appropriate an-

nexes are applicable to the settlement of the external debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises. It is, in particular, of the opinion that the external bonded debts of the City of Berlin are to be dealt with under Annex I, the bonded debts of the public utilities under Annex II, and that the miscellaneous debts of the City of Berlin and the Berlin public enterprises come under Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no further intergovernmental conference is required, and that negotiations can now be opened between the debtors and the creditor representatives.

The question of the actual terms of settlement of these debts will naturally be one of the principal subjects of the proposed negotiations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believes that the text of the Agreement and its annexes provides an ample margin to take into account the special political and economic position of Berlin.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is in agreement with the opinion of the Government of the United States of America that the three identical notes of the United States Embassy, the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy, dated February 29, 1956, and this Note as well as the two identical notes to the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy constitute an interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and that certified copies of these Notes should be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurance of its highest consideration.

Bonn, March 2, 1956

Question of Amending Proclamation Limiting Dairy Imports

White House press release dated March 21

The President announced on March 21 that the proclamation limiting imports of certain manufactured dairy products could not, on the basis of the United States Tariff Commission's recent limited investigation, be amended to include certain imports of cheeses not now considered subject to the terms of the proclamation. The President agreed with the majority of the Tariff Commission

that the amendments requested by the Department of Agriculture could be considered only after a full-scale investigation under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The Tariff Commission's investigation of last year was made pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, which provides only for the modification of existing proclamations when "changed circumstances" so require.

Proclamation 3019, which was issued on June 8, 1953,¹ established annual import quotas for certain manufactured dairy products, including specified types of cheeses. Some imports of Italian-type cheeses, either because of the ingredients they contain or because of the way in which they are packaged, have not been regarded by the Bureau of Customs as subject to Proclamation 3019. The Department of Agriculture has viewed these cheeses as indistinguishable from those admittedly covered by the proclamation and has sought to have such importations brought within the purview of the proclamation. On April 7, 1955, the President, pursuant to a request from the Department of Agriculture, directed the Tariff Commission to make a supplemental investigation pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22 to determine whether modification of Proclamation 3019 was warranted.²

The Tariff Commission reported its findings and conclusions to the President in July 1955.³ The majority and minority of the Commission divided on a legal issue, namely, whether the requested amendments to the proclamation to include cheeses not now considered under restriction could be accomplished pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, or whether such amendments should be the subject of a new, full-scale investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22. The President requested the advice of the Attorney General on this question, and it was his opinion that the requested amendments should not be made on the basis of the limited investigation under subsection (d). This was also the view of the majority of the Tariff Commission. After reviewing the case further, the President concurred with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission majority.

¹ BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

² *Ibid.*, May 16, 1955, p. 815.

³ Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

April 16, 1956

The advisability of requesting a new investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 is currently under study in the Department of Agriculture.

Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated March 17

The President on March 16 issued a proclamation providing that the duty on imports of tuna canned in brine shall automatically increase from 12½ percent to 25 percent ad valorem whenever in any year such imports exceed 20 percent of the previous year's U.S. pack of canned tuna of all varieties.

The proclamation gives effect to an exchange of notes with Iceland¹ which withdraws tuna canned in brine from the 1943 trade agreement with that country and to an invocation of the right reserved by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to increase the duty on tuna canned in brine.

In any calendar year the increased duty would apply only to those imports in excess of the stated 20 percent and only for the remainder of that year. Imports in any year up to the 20 percent breakpoint would be subject to the 12½ percent ad valorem rate. Because the President's proclamation will become effective on April 14, 1956, it provides that the increased rate of duty will apply this year if and when imports of tuna canned in brine after the April 14 date exceed 15 percent of last year's domestic pack of canned tuna.

In the 1943 trade agreement with Iceland, the United States reduced from 25 percent ad valorem to 12½ percent ad valorem the duty on certain miscellaneous canned fish, including such fish canned in brine, dutiable under tariff paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. This concession was intended primarily to cover certain speciality canned fish produced in Iceland. When tuna canned in brine became an article of international trade after the war, United States imports of this product were classified as miscel-

laneous canned fish under tariff paragraph 718 (b) and subject to this reduced rate in the Icelandic agreement. The withdrawal of this item from the Icelandic agreement in no way affects the concession granted on other fish specialties of primary interest to Iceland.

In the 1955 trade agreement negotiations involving Japan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United States agreed not to increase the existing rate of 12½ percent ad valorem applying to imports of tuna canned in brine, subject to the reservation of a right to impose a higher rate of duty on imports in any calendar year in excess of 20 percent of the domestic pack of canned tuna during the preceding year. This reservation has now been invoked. Because annual imports of tuna canned in brine are not at present amounting to 20 percent of the domestic tuna pack, no immediate application of the increased duty will follow upon the President's action.

PROCLAMATION 3128²

TERMINATING IN PART THE ICELANDIC TRADE AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS AND SUPPLEMENTING PROCLAMATION NO. 3105 OF JULY 22, 1955

1. WHEREAS, under authority of section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on August 27, 1943, entered into a trade agreement with the Regent of Iceland, including two schedules annexed thereto (57 Stat. 1078), and by proclamation of September 30, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075), he proclaimed the said trade agreement, which proclamation has been supplemented by proclamation of October 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 1098);

2. WHEREAS item 718(b) of Schedule II of the said trade agreement reads as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances): Any of the foregoing (except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each, and except salmon and anchovies)	12½% ad valorem

¹ Not printed.

² 21 Fed. Reg. 1793.

3. WHEREAS the Government of the United States and the Government of Iceland by an exchange of notes dated March 5 and 6, 1956, have agreed to the withdrawal, effective April 14, 1956, of tuna from said item 718(b), with the result that the said item shall thereafter read as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances; except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each; and except salmon, anchovies, and tuna)	12½% ad valorem

4. WHEREAS, under the authority of the said section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on June 8, 1955, entered into a trade agreement providing for the accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,³ which trade agreement consists of the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement, including Schedule XX contained in Annex A thereto, and by Proclamation No. 3105 of July 22, 1955 (20 F. R. 5379),⁴ he proclaimed the said trade agreement, which proclamation was supplemented by a notification of August 22, 1955 from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury (20 F. R. 6211);⁵

5. WHEREAS item 718(b) in Part I of the said Schedule XX reads as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than 15 pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances): Tuna NOTE: The United States reserves the right to increase the rate of duty on fish of the foregoing description which are entered in any calendar year in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	12½% ad val.

6. WHEREAS on March 16, 1956 the Government of the United States notified the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade that it invoked the reservation contained in the note to the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital of this proclamation, effective April 14, 1956; and

7. WHEREAS the first general note to the said Schedule XX specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation provides that the provisions of that schedule are subject to the following general note to Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1362):

4. If any tariff quota provided for in this Schedule, other than those provided for in items 771, becomes effective after the beginning of a period specified as the quota year, the quantity of the quota product entitled to enter under the quota during the unexpired portion of the quota year shall be the annual quota quantity less ½ thereof for each full calendar month that has expired in such period:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows:

Part I

In accordance with the exchange of notes specified in the third recital of this proclamation, I hereby terminate in part the proclamations of September 30, 1943, and October 22, 1943, referred to in the first recital of this proclamation, insofar as such proclamations apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the second recital of this proclamation, such termination to be effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, with the result that the rate of duty specified in the said item 718(b) shall thereafter apply only to the articles provided for in the said item as set forth in the third recital of this proclamation.

Part II

In accordance with the notification specified in the sixth recital of this proclamation I hereby terminate in part, effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, the said proclamation of July 22, 1955, and the said notification of August 22, 1955, referred to in the fourth recital, insofar as such proclamation and notification apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in the calendar year 1956 after April 14, 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 15 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna during the calendar year 1955, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and in any calendar year after 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as so reported, with the result that such tuna in excess of such 15 or 20 per centum of the United States pack shall be dutiable at 25 per centum ad valorem, the full rate provided for in paragraph 718(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat. (pt. 1) 633).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

³ BULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State

U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.¹

U.S./U.N. press release 2379 dated March 28

When speaking of atomic energy, we have become accustomed to talking in terms of reactors and megatons, kilograms of fissionable materials, and millions of dollars for equipment and research. Today we are talking only of books—but books are the bedrock of scientific progress.

The library which the United States Government has the honor of presenting to the United Nations today contains 45 volumes of information on basic research in atomic energy as well as many thousands of articles and technical reports published in this country and abroad. There are also many thousands of cards which index and describe all the nonclassified literature of the Atomic Energy Commission. This library will be kept up to date by the Atomic Energy Commission as new material becomes available.

In a statement made on the floor of the General Assembly on November 5, 1954,² I announced that the United States was prepared to make available to other countries the vast amount of documentation on atomic energy that was already freely published—totaling more than 200,000 pages of information. I suggested that we would be able to give 10 libraries containing these documents to countries interested in using them.

¹ Made at U.N. Headquarters on Mar. 28 on the occasion of the presentation of an Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 742.

Since that time, not 10 but more than 40 countries have requested these libraries; 33 have already been presented, and the others are on their way. Several more have been given to regional and international organizations interested in atomic energy development.

Our only request in return is that other cooperating nations send us their collections of official nonsecret papers to be placed in appropriate libraries in the United States.

The United States program of using the atom for man's betterment rather than for his destruction has proceeded along two lines of action: making facilities available and making information available. As President Eisenhower has said, our purpose is to spark the creative and inventive skills, to put them to work for the betterment of the conditions under which men must live. The President has also stressed that this must be a joint effort—"a continued partnership of the world's best minds."

For these reasons, it is a pleasure for me today to present to the United Nations Headquarters this library, symbolized by this one volume, for the use of the United Nations Secretariat and the delegations of member countries.

DESCRIPTION OF LIBRARY

U.S./U.N. press release 2380 dated March 28

This is a technical library of nonclassified data on nuclear energy and its applications. It is a comprehensive collection containing the equivalent of about 300 feet of library shelving and was developed by the Technical Information Service of the Atomic Energy Commission as one of the several Commission projects supporting the President's atoms-for-peace program. In it is to be found not only information unique to nuclear reactor technology and nuclear physics but also the recorded impact of atomic energy in such fields as chemistry, metallurgy, ceramics, electronics, biology, medicine, and agriculture.

The library, which weighs approximately 1,000 pounds, consists of about 10,000 Atomic Energy Commission research and development reports, 6,500 of which are on microcards; 34 bound volumes of scientific and technical texts on nuclear theory; and 11 bound volumes of abstracts of some 50,000 reports and articles published in this country and abroad. Also included are approximately

55,000 index cards. The library will be kept current and additional reports will be supplied as they are issued.

The library is one of 44 that have been presented or are in the process of being presented by the United States under the atoms-for-peace program. Previous recipients are:

Italy	Netherlands	The Council for Euro-
Spain	New Zealand	pean Nuclear Re-
Australia	Portugal	search (Switzerland)
Sweden	Peru	Chile
Greece	South Africa	Republic of China
Egypt	Israel	Dominican Republic
Burma	Norway	Haiti
Denmark	India	Lebanon
Austria	Argentina	Pakistan
Philippines	France	Switzerland
Finland	Japan	Thailand
Turkey	Brazil	Uruguay
		United Nations Library
		(Geneva)

Other libraries are in transit to:

Ceylon	Guatemala	Venezuela
Korea	Costa Rica	Iceland
Luxembourg	Iraq	

U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom

U.S./U.N. press release 2375 dated March 26

The United States on March 26 requested the inclusion of a new item on the agenda of the 21st Session of the Economic and Social Council relating to "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development."

Text of the note follows:

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to propose, in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, inclusion of the following topic as a sub-item to Item 5 (Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries) of the agenda of the Twenty-first Session of the Council: *Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development*.

The United States is proposing this item, as a matter of urgency, with a view to having prepared for submission to the Council at an early session an analysis and evaluation of reports and materials available concerning the possible uses of atomic energy for purposes of economic development, particularly of the underdeveloped countries.

The United States will in due course submit a draft resolution on this matter for consideration of the Council.

Dr. John C. Baker, the United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council, ex-

plained the purpose of this proposal in the following statement:

"A number of public, private, national, and international agencies and organizations are interested in the applications of atomic energy to economic development. It would be a help to realistic economic planning by private and public bodies if information on the economic aspects of this new and challenging subject could be coordinated and brought into one place.

"The United States believes that the Economic and Social Council at this stage is the appropriate organ for taking stock of the many reports and studies which are being made on the potentialities of atomic energy for economic development. The United States Government, therefore, has requested that the above item be placed on the provisional agenda of the 21st Session of Ecosoc."

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Travel Congress

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 174) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress, which will meet at San José, Costa Rica, April 12-22, 1956, by a delegation composed of the following representatives of U.S. Government agencies and of private groups concerned with travel matters:

Chairman

Henry H. Kelly, Special Assistant on International Travel, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Vice Chairman

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Members

Malcolm Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public Health Service

Godfrey Macdonald, Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

William F. McGrath, Executive Vice President, American Society of Travel Agents, New York, N.Y.

Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President, Mississippi Shipping Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Norman J. Phillion, Colonial Airlines, for the Air Transport Association of America, New York, N.Y.
 Russell E. Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.
 Knud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service

The Sixth Congress will consider reports of its technical committees on (1) research and organization, (2) removal of travel barriers, (3) travel plant (i. e. hotels), and (4) tourist-travel promotion.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956.

Signature: Burma, March 14, 1956.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, February 21, 1956; Jordan, February 23, 1956.

Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of extension to: Land Berlin (effective date to be the same as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. July 26, 1955).

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.¹

Signature: Dominican Republic, March 6, 1956.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.

War Criminals

Penal administrative agreement. Concluded at Bonn and deemed to have entered into force May 5, 1955.

Signatures: France, September 29, 1955; Federal Republic of Germany, November 1, 1955; United States, December 20, 1955; United Kingdom, December 22, 1955.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement outlining the procedure for financing the delivery of nitrogenous fertilizer to Spain pursuant to the agricultural commodities agreement of February 7, 1956 (TIAS 3505). Effected by exchange of letters at Vienna March 5 and 6, 1956. Entered into force March 6, 1956.

Finland

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by providing for the purchase of additional commodities, and exchange of notes. Signed at Helsinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.

Agreement amending articles II and III of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248). Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.

Netherlands

Agreement extending the agreement of April 11, 1947 (TIAS 1777) relating to American war graves in the Netherlands. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague January 14 and August 29, 1955, and March 9, 1956. Entered into force on the date of receipt by the United States of notification of constitutional approval by the Netherlands.

Spain

Parcel post agreement. Signed at Madrid July 16 and at Washington August 30, 1955. Ratified and approved by the President September 23, 1955.

Entered into force: January 1, 1956 (the date "mutually settled between the Administrations of the two countries").

THE DEPARTMENT

Resignations

On March 21 President Eisenhower accepted the resignation of Christian A. Herter, Jr., as General Counsel of the International Cooperation Administration. The effective date of the resignation was March 19. For the texts of Mr. Herter's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release dated March 21.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Dempster McIntosh to be Ambassador to Venezuela.

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Sheldon T. Mills to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Jefferson Patterson to be Ambassador to Uruguay.

Afghanistan. Mills confirmed as Ambassador	658
Agriculture. Question of Amending Proclamation Limiting Dairy Imports	653
American Republics. Inter-American Travel Congress	657
Atomic Energy U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to United Nations (Lodge)	656
U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom	657
Canada. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cortines)	636
Economic Affairs Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text of proclamation)	654
Inter-American Travel Congress	657
Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin	651
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport Agreement	650
Educational Exchange. NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman	649
Europe. Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower)	636
Foreign Service Confirmations (McIntosh, Mills, Patterson)	658
Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee	651
France. Visit of French Foreign Minister (Dulles)	638
Germany. Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin	651
Iceland Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text of proclamation)	654
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
Indonesia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
International Information Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower)	636
The Message of America (Eisenhower)	633
International Organizations and Meetings Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting	637
Inter-American Travel Congress	657
Japan. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
Liberia. Letters of Credence (Padmore)	637
Mexico. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cortines)	636
Near East Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting	637
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to Middle East (Lodge, text of resolution)	627
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
Netherlands Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport Agreement	650
North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Murphy)	644
NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman	649
Presidential Documents Crusade for Freedom	636
Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting	636
Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine	654
The Message of America	633
Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State	651
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State (text of Executive order)	650

Spain. Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs	633
State, Department of Resignation (Herter)	658
Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State (text of Executive order)	650
Treaty Information. Current Actions	658
U.S.S.R. Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era (Dulles)	637
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	638
United Nations Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to Middle East (Lodge, text of resolution)	627
U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations (Lodge)	656
U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom	657
Uruguay. Patterson confirmed as Ambassador	658
Venezuela. McIntosh confirmed as Ambassador	658

Name Index

Baker, John C.	657
Ball, M. Margaret	649
Dulles, Secretary	637, 638
Eisenhower, President	633, 636, 651, 654
Henderson, Loy	637
Herter, Christian A., Jr.	658
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.	627, 656
Martin Artajo, Alberto	633
McIntosh, Dempster	658
Mills, Sheldon T.	658
Murphy, Robert	644
Padmore, George Arthur	637
Patterson, Jefferson	658
Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo	637
St. Laurent, Louis	636

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 2-8

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
168	4/2	Murphy: NATO symposium at Norfolk.
169	4/3	External debts of Berlin.
170	4/3	Dulles: visit of Foreign Minister Pineau.
171	4/3	Dulles: Soviet repudiation of Stalin.
172	4/3	Dulles: news conference transcript.
173	4/4	American winner of NATO fellowship (rewrite).
174	4/5	Delegation to Inter-American Travel Congress (rewrite).
175	4/5	Visit of Spanish Foreign Minister (rewrite).
176	4/5	U.S.-Netherlands aviation talks.
177	4/6	Advisory Committee to Foreign Service Institute.
178	4/6	Phleger: New York Bar Association.
*179	4/6	Japan credentials.
180	4/6	Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council meeting.
181	4/7	Liberia credentials (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Publication 6296

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